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ABSTRACT 
In the behavioral economics literature, the dynamics of cooperation in groups have 
received a great deal of interest. There are many studies investigating the effect of 
some individual characteristics and external factors on cooperation behavior of 
individuals in different settings. The findings of those studies show that the effect 
of a policy on cooperation is greater when the policy is chosen democratically by 
group members than when it is imposed exogenously. With this motivation, in this 
thesis study, I mainly focus on whether cooperation behavior of individuals is 
influenced by the mechanisms imposing the rules when there is a conflict between 
what is individually optimal and what is optimal for the society as a whole. In an 
experimental setting, using a prisoners’ dilemma game which can be transformed 
into a coordination game, the study questions if people can coordinate on the 
socially efficient equilibrium when the transformation is imposed democratically. 
Also, with a coordination game it is investigated how people coordinate when there 
are more than one equilibrium. The results cannot confirm the claim that democratic 
decision-making processes increase cooperation but suggest that individual-level 
cooperation is influenced by prior mutual cooperation experience and some 
personal characteristics. 
 
Key Words: Cooperation, prisoners’ dilemma, voting, coordination, experiment. 
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ÖZET 
Gruplardaki iş birlikçi davranış dinamikleri, davranışsal iktisat literatüründe pek 
çok akademik çalışmaya konu olmuştur. Literatürde bulunan çalışmaların büyük 
çoğunluğu, farklı koşullar altında, dışsal faktörlerin ve bireylerin kişisel 
tercihlerinin işbirlikçi davranışı nasıl etkilediği sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. Bu 
çalışmalardan elde edilen bulgular ve sonuçlar, kuralların demokratik yöntemlerle 
koyulması durumunda, bireylerin koyulan kurallara uyma eğilimi sergileyip daha 
iş birlikçi davrandıklarını göstermiştir. Literatüreki bu sonuçlardan hareketle, bu 
tez çalışmasında mahkumlar ikilemi oyunu kullanılarak, toplumsal ve bireysel 
tercihlerin çatıştığı durumlarda iş birlikçi davranışla kural koyma yöntemleri 
arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl şekillendiği üzerinde durulmaktadır. Ayrıca, bir 
koordinasyon oyunuyla bireylerin iki farklı denge olması durumunda nasıl koordine 
oldukları da incenlenmektedir. Çalışma kapasamında yapılan iktisadi deneylerde, 
demokratik karar verme süreçlerinin işbirlikçi davranışı olumlu etkilediğini 
destekleyen sonuçlara ulaşılamamıştır. Ancak, deneylerden elde edilen sonuçlar 
bireysel işbirliği davranışının bireylerin daha önceki karşılıklı iş birliği 
deneyimlerinden ve bazı kişisel özelliklerden etkilendiği ortaya koymuştur. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İş birliği, Mahkumlar ikilemi, Oy verme, koordinasyon, 
deney.
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
According to North (1990), institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. 
These rules not only affect how people behave but also how they make their 
decisions in the first place. In line with this understanding, Acemoğlu and Robinson 
(2001) emphasize the relationship between institutional characteristics and 
collective decision-making methods that influence both the political and social 
organization of societies and hence the economic performance in the long run. 
With a desire for understanding and analyzing human behavior, especially the 
dynamics of cooperation in groups, in my thesis study, I want to investigate whether 
the way in which a rule/policy is imposed affects prosocial behavior. In an 
experimental setting, I test the claim that the effect of a policy on the level of 
cooperation is greater when the policy chosen democratically by group members 
than when it is imposed by an external body. 
In addition to the effect of democratic processes on cooperation, I also concentrate 
on how people make their decisions when there is a tension between individual and 
social interests. From personal characteristics, including risk attitudes and trust 
preferences, to past experiences, I consider many possible explanatory factors to 
understand how individuals behave in such choice environments. It is worth to 
mention that I am interested in not only cooperation behavior but also coordination 
among individuals.  
In the experiment, after having played a prisoners’ dilemma game for several 
periods, the participants are given a chance to modify that game into a coordination 
game with two Nash equilibria. My aim here is to see if the participants consider 
playing the modified game where the socially efficient outcome is one of the two 
Nash equilibria, and also if the socially efficient equilibrium is achieved by mutual 
cooperation. In the two main treatments, by changing the group size, I want to 
observe the potential impact of the size of the majority on cooperative behavior if 
it exists. Also, in the third treatment, using a coordination game, I aim to understand 
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if people can coordinate on the efficient outcome when they have no prior 
experience. Basically, this treatment informs us about how people behave in the 
coordination game and serve as a model to compare with the cases where the PD 
game is transformed into the coordination game. 
The remainder of this thesis study is organized as follows. In Section II, I review 
the studies in the behavioral economics literature that concentrate on similar 
questions and briefly mention the contribution of my study to the existing literature. 
Then, in Section III, I explain the benchmark study which inspired my thesis, and 
after that present my experimental design in detail. In Section IV, I present my 
analyses in detail and share the main findings and results. Finally, the concluding 
remarks and future research ideas are presented. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the behavioral economics literature, there are many studies that investigate the 
relationship between the way in which a policy is imposed and prosocial behavior. 
Almost all of the studies focusing on this relationship present similar results 
supporting the idea that the effect of a policy on prosocial behavior is greater when 
it is chosen democratically by the subjects than when it is exogenously imposed. 
The majority of the studies in the existing experimental literature focus on the 
relationship between democratic processes and prosocial behavior. These studies 
analyze the dynamics of prosocial behavior using a public good game setting in 
which there is a conflict of interest between society and individual. From a game-
theoretical perspective, we know that in a standard voluntary contribution 
mechanism (VCM) what is socially efficient is not the best strategy to apply for a 
rational individual who wants to maximize her own utility only. However, by 
inducing different mechanisms, both informal and formal, into the standard public 
good provision game, it is possible to modify actions of the players and make them 
deviate from the strategy they adopt in the standard version. Here, I focus on the 
studies that question the relationship between the way how a policy is imposed 
(endogenous or exogenous) and cooperative behavior and highlight the key findings 
of those studies that provide fruitful insights for my thesis. 
In their experimental study, Tyran and Feld (2006) investigate the effects of mild 
law (non-deterrent sanctions) on the provision of public good by comparing it to 
severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law cases. The rule they concentrate on 
makes the contribution to a public good obligatory and sanctions free-riding. The 
results of the study show that exogenously imposed mild law does not achieve 
compliance, but compliance is much more improved if mild law is endogenously 
chosen through voting. Voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, 
and therefore, people tend to comply with the rule if they expect others to do so. As 
it is seen, the way a policy is imposed can be understood as a signal for the behavior 
of the others and thus affect the behavior of individuals and the level of the public 
good. 
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Using a VCM in which punishment may be imposed depending on subjects’ votes, 
Ertan, Page, and Putterman (2009), show that punishment in a VCM game leads to 
efficiency when the punishment that is targeted at low contributors is allowed 
democratically. Also, the authors question whether having a prior experience makes 
any significant difference in individuals’ behavior in similar settings.  
In a different study, Sutter, Haigner, and Kocher (2010) analyze a VCM in which 
individuals can endogenously determine whether they want to add an option of 
rewarding or punishing other group members. The main result of the paper supports 
the authors’ claim that there is a positive effect of endogenous institutional choice 
on the level of cooperation. They also find that there will be higher contributions 
when a given rule is chosen endogenously than when it is implemented 
exogenously. 
In the context of repeated public good games, Ambrus and Greiner (2018) 
investigate the impact of democratic punishment, that is group members decide to 
punish other members by majority voting, on the level of cooperation and average 
payoffs. The main finding of the study is that democratic punishment facilitates 
cooperation and also results in higher average payoffs. Moreover, they conclude 
that participation in democratic punishment makes punishment intentions more pro-
social. 
Finally, in the study that I take as a benchmark for my thesis, Dal Bó, Foster, and 
Putterman (2010) question whether the influence of policy on cooperation behavior 
among individuals is more pronounced when it is chosen democratically by the 
group members than when it is exogenously imposed. The authors find supporting 
results. 
The contribution of my study to the current literature is that, in addition to the 
relation between policy selection mechanism and cooperation behavior, I also 
investigate many other individual and external factors that can influence prosocial 
behavior in groups. My thesis differs from the existing studies since it aims to 
capture a greater portion of the factors that potentially affect the relationship 
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between democratic mechanisms and cooperation. By changing the group size in 
two separate treatments, I analyze the possible interaction between the size of the 
majority and cooperative behavior. Moreover, I try to explain how individual 
factors including risk attitudes, trust preferences, and cognitive skills affect the way 
people decide when there is a conflict between what is socially efficient and what 
is individually rational. In addition to these, my thesis focuses on how both 
cooperation and coordination among individuals is affected by prior experiences. 
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3. THE EXPERIMENT 
 
3.1. The Benchmark Study 
The study I take as a benchmark for my thesis study is the paper of Dal Bó, Foster, 
and Putterman (2010), which mainly concentrates on the effect of democratic 
institutions on cooperation among individuals. In the paper, the authors argue that 
a policy that is chosen democratically by the group members encourages 
cooperation. To test this claim, they use a prisoners' dilemma game that may be 
transformed into a coordination game by a simple majority (endogenous 
modification) or by a computer (exogenous modification).  
As it is quite well-known, the prisoners’ dilemma game has a unique Nash 
equilibrium that is mutual defection (DD). In the modified coordination game, 
however, there are two Nash equilibria - mutual defection (DD) and mutual 
cooperation (CC). Therefore, the game is modified in a way that the socially 
efficient outcome, mutual cooperation, becomes an equilibrium outcome. Since the 
mutual defection is still an equilibrium, participants who expect that the mutual 
defection will be the outcome of the modified game have no incentive to modify 
the initial payoffs. On the other hand, those who expect mutual cooperation to be 
the outcome of the game when the payoffs are modified will have an incentive to 
vote in favor of modification (Dal Bo et al. 2010). The normal-form games are 
given below. 
 
 
 
C D 
C 50, 50 10, 60 
D 60, 10 40, 40 
 
 
C D 
C 50, 50 10, 48 
D 48, 10 40, 40 
Figure 1. Initial payoffs, Dal Bo et al. (2010) Figure 2. Modified payoffs, Dal Bo et al. (2010) 
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In an experimental setting, they aim to compare the cooperation rate, which is 
defined as playing CC, between the exogenously modified games and the ones for 
which the modification is endogenous. In the first part of the experiment, the 
subjects play the PD game with given payoffs. Then, at the beginning of the second 
part, they might change the payoffs by a vote, and continue to play the modified 
game. 
Members in each group consist of four subjects vote on whether to modify the 
payoffs and hence to continue to play with the modified payoffs. Then, the 
computer randomly decides whether to consider the result of the vote in each group. 
If the computer considers the votes, then the majority wins. In case of a tie, the 
computer breaks it. If the computer does not consider the votes in a group, then it 
might modify the payoffs or might not change them. The computer’s decision will 
be random. The figure given below summarizes the voting mechanism the study 
uses. 
 
 
When the authors analyze the data obtained, they find that the effect of a policy on 
the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen by the majority of group 
Figure 3. Voting stage (Dal Bo et al., 2010) 
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members than when it is imposed from outside. Also, they decompose the effect of 
the endogenous modification and show that this is due to a selection effect and an 
“endogeneity premium” effect. By selection effect, the authors mean that players 
who vote for modification are different from those who do not in terms of their 
cooperation preferences. Similarly, as they define in the paper, endogeneity 
premium results from the fact that individuals with similar characteristics facing 
the same game might choose different actions depending on the modification 
mechanism. As a significant contribution to the existing literature, the paper 
distinguishes these two effects to analyze the real effect of democracy. 
 
3.2. Experimental Design 
In my experiment there are three treatments.  
 Treatment 1: Small group treatment 
 Treatment 2: Large group treatment 
 Treatment 3: Coordination game treatment 
 
Small Group Treatment 
In the small group treatment, subjects are divided into groups of 6 people, and 
members of each group remain unchanged for the entire session. Group size is 
determined to be six, which is an even number to maximize the probability of a tie 
that will be broken by the computer.  
The experiment consists of two parts. In the first part, participants play ten rounds 
of a PD game with the payoffs presented below. For the sake of neutrality, I name 
the actions as Action 1 and Action 2. In each round, they are randomly matched 
with a different group member and play the game.  
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In the next part, there are ten rounds as well. At the beginning of this part, however, 
the subjects might change the initial payoffs by vote and transform the initial game 
into a coordination game presented above (Figure 5). The modification is in the 
form of a reduction in the payoff of unilateral defection, which is similar to the one 
that Del Bo et. al (2010) impose. In my experiment, however, the amount of 
reduction is smaller than that in the benchmark study. The payoff that a subject gets 
when she defects unilaterally is determined as 49 to understand better how she 
behaves when the difference between the payoffs is that small. As I already 
explained, members in each group vote on whether to modify payoffs and hence to 
continue to play with the modified payoffs. Then, the computer randomly decides 
whether to consider the result of the vote in each group. If the computer decides to 
consider the votes in a group, then the majority wins. In case of a tie, the computer 
breaks it. If the computer does not consider the votes, then it might modify the 
payoffs or might not change them. The computer’s decision is random. 
The subjects learn whether their votes are considered by the computer and whether 
they will play with the modified payoffs. Also, they are informed about the exact 
distribution of votes in their group. After the voting stage, they play the chosen 
game, the previously played one or the modified one, for another ten rounds.  
When the second part is completed, I ask the subjects to answer some questions to 
learn about their reasoning in the experiment. In addition to the experiment related 
questions, they are expected to answer some additional questions revealing their 
risk preferences and trust attitude. These questions are taken from "The Preference 
 
 
Action 1 (C) Action 2 (D) 
Action 1 (C) 50, 50 10, 60 
Action 2 (D) 60, 10 40, 40 
 
 
Action 1 (C) Action 2 (D) 
Action 1 (C) 50, 50 10, 49 
Action 2 (D) 49, 10 40, 40 
Figure 4. Unmodified game, Dal Bo et al. (2010) Figure 5. Modified game  
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Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and Social 
Preference" (Falk et. al, 2016). 
In order to measure the participants’ trust level, I ask them the following validated 
survey question: 
How well does the following statement describe you as a person? As long 
as I am not convinced otherwise, I always assume that people have only the 
best intentions. Please use a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “does not 
describe me at all” and a10 means “describes me perfectly”. 
To reveal the subjects’ risk attitudes, I combine two different tools. First, they are 
asked to self-assess their risk appetite by answering the following question 
formulated by Falk et. al, 2016: 
How do you see yourself: are you a person who is generally willing to take 
risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please use a scale from 0 to 10, 
where a 0 means you are “completely unwilling to take risks” and a 10 
means you are “very willing to take risks”.  
In addition to the self-assessment question, the subjects are also asked to make a 
choice between a lottery and a safe option. I use the first question of the staircase 
risk assessment method developed by Falk et al. in the Preference Survey Module 
(Falk et al., 2016). The question is presented in Appendix I. 
Furthermore, the subjects report some personal academic information including 
their scholarship status and major of study.  
In order to calculate the earnings, we choose four periods randomly and take the 
arithmetic average of the points that the subjects earned in these chosen periods. 
This average is multiplied by 0.5 TL, and the amount earned is determined in money 
terms. 
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Large Group Treatment 
In the large group treatment, participants go through the same stages, but the group 
size is increased. This time, every subject in the lab participates in the vote in a 
group of 30 people.  Again, the computer decides whether to consider the result of 
the vote or not. As I mentioned earlier, comparing these two treatments, I want to 
understand if the size of the majority has an impact on cooperative behavior in 
groups. 
 
Coordination Treatment 
In addition to these two treatments, I have a third treatment to observe how 
individuals behave in the coordination game when they have no prior experience 
with the PD game. In this treatment, each subject is randomly paired with another 
subject in each round, and they play the coordination game for 20 rounds. With this 
treatment, I aim to understand how the subjects behave in a game with two 
equilibria when they do not have prior experience with a PD game in which there 
is a temptation payoff that functions as a reference point and makes not to cooperate 
more attractive. 
 
Hypotheses to Be Tested in This Study 
In this experimental setting, I test the following hypotheses: 
𝑯𝟏: In the first part of the game, cooperation decreases with experience.  
𝑯𝟐: Subjects who experience mutual cooperation outcome more frequently in the 
first part of the game will expect that CC will be the outcome of the modified game 
as well and hence have an incentive to vote for modification.  
𝑯𝟑: Subjects who play C more frequently in the first part of the game will continue 
to play C after the voting stage. 
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𝑯𝟒: If the game is modified endogenously, then group members will be more likely 
to cooperate (effect of democracy). 
𝑯𝟓: Group size, in other words, the size of the majority, affects cooperative 
behavior.  
𝑯𝟔: Cooperation behavior is closely linked with trust among individuals. 
𝑯𝟕: Cooperation behavior is closely linked with some other personal 
characteristics including risk preferences, cognitive skills, laboratory experience, 
education of parents and so. 
𝑯𝟖: Coordination among individuals depends on prior experiences.   
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4. RESULTS 
We conducted eight experimental sessions from June 2018 to February 2019 at 
Bilgi Economics Lab of Istanbul (BELIS). The table below shows the distribution 
of the subjects across treatments. 
Coordination  
(No-voting) treatment 
Large group treatment Small group treatment 
2 sessions 
3 sessions – 3 group 
observations 
3 sessions – 12 group 
observations 
30 subjects per session 
60 subjects in total 
30 subjects per session 
90 subjects in total 
24 subjects per session 
72 subjects in total 
 
 
 
In total, 222 subjects participated in the experiment. 162 of them played the version 
with a voting stage, whereas 60 students participated in the coordination game 
treatment.  
The subjects were Istanbul Bilgi University undergraduate students and recruited 
through ORSEE. On average, the participants earned 19.59 TL with a maximum of 
25 TL and a minimum of 5 TL. They spent less than one hour (45 minutes 
approximately) in the laboratory. Given the duration of a session, it can be claimed 
that the subjects earned a considerable amount. Since I did not want to affect the 
subjects' decisions, by offering a sure amount of money which is independent of 
their actions in the game, there was no show-up fee.  
Below table shows the summary statistics of the sessions. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of the subjects across treatments 
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Age 22.22 (max: 46, min:18) 
Sex F: 119 (53.6%))  M: 103 (46.4%) 
Faculty Law: 19 (8.6%)  
Communications: 19 (8.6%) 
Engineering: 60 (27%)      
Health Sciences: 21 (9.4% 
Business: 35 (15.8%)    
Architecture: 4 (1.8%) 
Social Sciences: 40 (18%)         
Vocational School: 24 
(10.8%) 
Scholarship No scholarship: 39 (17.6%) 
Full scholarship: 76 (34.2%) 
Partial scholarship 107 
(48.2%) 
 
Previous lab experience Yes: 177 (79.7%)   No: 45 (20.3%) 
Previous game theory knowledge Yes: 60 (27%) No: 162 (73%) 
 
 
As it is shown in the table, most of the subjects, who participated in the sessions 
had previously attended other experiments. However, only 30% of them claimed 
that they had encountered game theory before.  
 
4.1. Mutual Cooperation 
I start with the results of coordination treatment, then present the findings in the 
large group and small group treatments, respectively. 
 
4.1.1. Coordination Treatment 
Considering the treatment in which the participants play 20 rounds of the 
coordination game, it is seen that the level of coordination on the 50-50 equilibrium 
where both players playing C was decreasing as the session continued. The average 
level of coordination on the better equilibrium is found to be 17% with a maximum 
of 40% in the first round. After the tenth round, coordination on the efficient 
outcome became very unlikely, and it is observed that most of the players played 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
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D, hence the game ended up at the 40-40 equilibrium. The following table 
summarizes the level of mutual cooperation throughout the coordination game. 
 
 
I conclude that even if there is no temptation payoff that the subjects recall from 
their past experiences, they still do not play CC as the game continues. Coordination 
on the efficient outcome, in other words, mutual cooperation, decreases with 
experience.  
When we remove the temptation payoff, the most plausible explanation that we can 
argue for the decrease in coordination on the efficient outcome is the low level of 
trust between individuals. We can claim that the subjects played D because they 
thought that the other player would want them to get the “sucker payoff” (10) and 
therefore would play D. In other words, as a result of the low level of trust among 
the subjects, they decided to play D to guarantee a payoff of 40. When we check 
the answers of the participants to the question asking how they made decisions 
during the game, it is seen that most of them mentioned that they were motivated 
to play C (Action 1 in the game), but then they had to play D (Action 2) since the 
other player continued to play D. Also, most of the subjects defined D as the less 
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Figure 6. Cooperation rates in the coordination game 
 16 
risky action in the game just because the lowest payoff that they get from playing 
D is 40 whereas for C it is 10. 
 
4.1.2 Large Group Treatment 
In large group treatment, we observe that the average level of mutual cooperation, 
both players playing C, in the first part of the game is found to be 5.78% with a 
maximum of 33.33% in the first round. In the last round of the first part, cooperation 
decreases to 0 with experience as expected.  
 
 
In the second part of the game, however, depending on the result of the vote, there 
are four cases to consider. Since I have only three large group observations, I can 
analyze the cooperation levels in a large group for the endogenous no modification, 
exogenous modification, and exogenous no modification cases. When these cases 
are compared, we obtain very similar results for the cooperation between subjects. 
Considering the data collected from these three cases together, it is found that in 
each case the average level of cooperation in the second part of the game was almost 
zero. We see that there is only one pair playing CC in the eleventh period. As 
discussed earlier, the subjects voted for no modification with an expectation that 
the mutual cooperation wouldn’t be played in the upcoming rounds. Therefore, 
0.00
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Figure 7. Cooperation rates in the first part (n=30) 
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almost none of the subjects played C as expected, and only one mutual cooperation 
outcome is observed in the eleventh round.  
 
4.1.3 Small Group Treatment 
In the small group treatment where the group size is 6, again, we observe that the 
level of cooperation decreased with experience in the first part. The average level 
of cooperation in the first ten rounds was 5.55% with a maximum of 33.33% in the 
first round of the game. As expected, in the last round before the voting stage none 
of the subjects played C, and therefore the rate of cooperation decreased to 0. 
 
 
Similar to the large group treatment, depending on the result of the vote, there will 
be four possible cases to be considered in the second part of the game. In this 
treatment, I collected 12 small group observations. 
We conclude that the mutual cooperation in the large group and small group 
treatments is not statistically different since the Wilcoxon rank-sum test gives a z-
value of -0.360. Test results are presented in Appendix I. 
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Figure 8. Cooperation rates in the first part (n=6) 
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4.2. Cooperation at Individual Level  
In this section, I focus on cooperation at the individual level. First, I will present 
the distribution of playing C in the two voting treatments, large group, and small 
group, namely.  
In the large group treatment, among the 90 subjects, the ratio of playing action C 
throughout the game is 12.1% on average. As it is shown in the below table, thirty 
subjects never played C in any round in the experiment, and only one subject played 
C in all rounds.  
 
 
Similarly, in the small group treatment, the average ratio of playing C in 20 rounds 
is found to be 13.3%. In other words, considering all 20 rounds in each session, it 
is observed that action C is played by the subjects 191 times in total. Below tables 
summarizes the distribution in the small group treatment.  
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Figure 9. Distribution of playing C throughout the game (n=30) 
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In addition to these results, I also report the findings regarding the individual level 
cooperation dynamics in the first of the part game. Using the cooperation pattern of 
the subjects in the first ten rounds before the voting stage, we can explain both their 
voting behavior and their cooperation behavior in the second half conditional on 
the outcome of the vote.  
Considering the large group treatment, it is observed that the average ratio of 
playing action C is calculated as 22.6% at the individual level. Put it differently 
action C is played by the subjects 163 times in 720 rounds.  
In the small group treatment, when we check the actions of the subjects in the first 
ten rounds, it is found that the ratio of playing action C is 19.6% on average. So, 
the number of rounds action C played by the subjects is 141 in total taken all the 
rounds in the small group treatments into account together. On the other hand, in 
the small group treatment, when we check the actions of the subjects in the first ten 
rounds, it is found that the ratio of playing action C is 19.6% on average. The 
number of rounds in which action C played is 141 considering all the rounds in the 
small group treatments. Distribution of playing action C is summarized below. 
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When we test whether the distributions are statistically different, we observe that 
this is not the case. According to my findings, cooperation at the individual level 
does not depend on group size. 
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Figure 12. Distribution of playing C in the first part (n=6) 
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Finally, I mention the importance of periods in which the action of a subject is C, 
but the outcome of that period is CD. I think it is crucial to discuss that the voting 
behavior of a subject is also affected by the periods where she wants to cooperate, 
but the other part does not since her belief about the possibility of CC being an 
outcome in the upcoming periods is shaped by unilateral defection outcomes that 
she faced earlier. Again, in this part, I focus on the small group and large group 
treatments separately. 
The tables given below show the distribution of CD outcomes before the voting 
stage, observed by the individuals who played C in those periods. It is worth to 
mention that these distributions are conditional on that a subject played C and 
therefore 0 means the subject did not face CD but CC as the outcome of that period. 
For instance, in the large group treatment, there is one subject who wanted to 
cooperate but faced D 9 times in the first half of the game. When we examine the 
small group treatment, the maximum number of rounds in which a subject played 
C but the outcome in this round was CD is found to be 4. 
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Considering all the findings together, we conclude that group size does not matter 
for cooperation. Also, in the regression analyses, I include group size as a dummy 
variable to see if it has an impact on cooperation together with other explanatory 
variables. However, it is found to be insignificant. 
 
4.3. Voting Behavior 
As I mentioned earlier, in the coordination game, the equilibrium outcome of the 
initial game is still an equilibrium. Therefore, if subjects expect to coordinate on 
DD when the payoffs are changed, then they have no incentive to vote for 
modification. We can claim that the optimal voting decision depends on the 
subjects’ expectation of how other players will act in the coordination game. Hence, 
if a subject expects that mutual cooperation will be achieved in the modified 
version, she should vote for modification. 
In the experimental results, it is observed that in none of the treatments the majority 
voted for modification. Only in one small group, there was a tie where three subjects 
voted for modification of the payoffs whereas the remaining three voted for no 
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modification. In that case, the computer broke the tie. The table and figure given 
below summarize the distribution of the votes across treatments. 
 
 Vote to modify EndoMod EndoNot ExoMod ExoNot Total 
Large group 
Yes - 5 8 5 18 
No - 25 22 25 72 
Small group 
Yes - 4 3 6 13 
No - 32 9 18 59 
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Figure 15. Distribution of the votes across treatments 
 
Table 3. Distribution of the votes across four possible voting stage outcomes 
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When we test whether the distribution of voting for modification differs across 
treatments, we see that there is no statistically significant difference. The Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test gives a p-value of 0.719, implying that there is no difference in the 
distribution of votes for these two treatments. 
As it is shown in Table 3, by the construction of the voting stage, there are four 
possible cases to occur. First, the majority might be in favor of the modification of 
the payoffs or not, and the computer decides to consider the votes. There will be 
two possible cases: endogenous modification or endogenous no modification. 
Second, no matter what the result of the vote is the computer might decide not to 
consider the votes and randomly change the payoffs or not. So, the possible cases 
will be an exogenous modification or exogenous no modification. While denoting 
these four possible cases, I borrowed the labels that the authors of the benchmark 
study created (Dal Bó et al., 2010). Endo denotes that the votes of the group were 
considered, Exo denotes that the computer didn’t consider the votes, and Mod 
denotes that payoffs of the initial game were modified versus Not. 
We see that there is no observation in the first column of the table. In order to 
explain why there was no endogenous modification observation, we can argue for 
some plausible reasons. As I explained earlier, the modification that can be imposed 
is in the form of a decrease in the temptation payoff. By removing that payoff, I 
aim to make it easier for people to coordinate in the socially efficient outcome that 
is mutual cooperation. However, as the results suggest, the subjects did not consider 
this modification as an opportunity for a collective gain that will benefit both 
players. Instead, they concentrated on the possible gain of the temptation payoff 
and therefore wanted to keep playing the PD game.  
Besides, we can suggest that it was not only the temptation payoff but also the 
expectation that the outcome in the modified game would be mutual defection that 
motivated the subjects to vote for no modification. They expected that the other 
player would play D and therefore the game would end up at the inefficient 
equilibrium (40-40), which was also the equilibrium of the PD game. In a way, it 
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can be said that the lack of trust among individuals prevented them from relying on 
the other player, and the subjects did not want to lose the possibility of gaining the 
temptation payoff. This can be a plausible reason for the implementation of 
inefficient policies.  
Another possible explanation of why the subjects did not vote for modification 
might be that they apply a max-min strategy in both games. Therefore, no matter 
what the other player does, a subject plays D to secure a minimum payoff of 40 for 
herself. Considering this strategy, we can claim that since the mutual defection is a 
possible equilibrium outcome in both the PD game and the coordination game, the 
players have no incentive to change the initial game which also promises a possible 
temptation payoff of 60 when D is played.  
In the literature, there are many studies that concentrate on the effects of 
sociocultural differences on social decision-making and especially on the level of 
cooperation among individuals. In different settings from ultimatum games to 
public good provision games and repeated prisoners’ dilemma games, there are 
different findings on the relationship between cultural components and the 
strategies that players follow. In her meta-analysis paper, Rezaei (2015) examines 
37 papers with 107 observations from repeated prisoner's dilemma experiments 
conducted in 12 different countries. The findings provide evidence that there is no 
significant difference in the repeated prisoner's dilemma's cooperation rate between 
different cultures. 
In addition to these, some studies in the literature specifically investigate the effect 
of social capital on cooperation behavior. Karlan (2005) claims that the higher the 
social capital, in other words, the higher the trust between individuals, the more 
they are able to cooperate and coordinate. For instance, in a public good provision 
game setting, it is found that the most important measures of individual social 
capital, the self-assessment trust question that I use in the questionnaire and 
membership in voluntary associations, are strongly correlated with higher 
contributions in the public-goods experiment (Anderson et. al, 2004). This result 
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allows us to argue that the low level of social capital of the participants can be a 
plausible explanation for why they do not vote for modification.  
The result for the measure of trust in Turkey from the World Value Survey (WVS) 
supports above-mentioned inferences. The trust question used in the WVS is quite 
similar to the one that I asked in the experiment: "Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing 
with people?" According to the WVS conducted in 2014, the ratio of Turkish people 
agreeing with the statement "most people can be trusted" is 12.01% which is quite 
low compared to most of the developed countries (World Values Survey, 2014).  
However, the paper claims that it is not possible to distinguish between countries 
with a very high level and those with a low level of trust at their cooperation level 
(Rezaei, 2015).  
Before presenting the regression results, I report the survey results regarding the 
risk and trust preferences of the participants. 
In the survey, the average self-assessed trust score was found to be 5.64. Similarly, 
the average self-assessed risk score was calculated as 4.64. Moreover, it is found 
that 82.8% of the subject preferred the safe amount, whereas the remaining 17.2% 
chose the lottery. Below table compares the self-assessment of the subjects and their 
choice in the first step of e staircase procedure. 
Self-assessment Lottery or safe amount? 
Risk averse (0 - 3) 83 (37.4%) 1 82 
Risk neutral (4 – 6) 82 (36.9%) 10 72 
Risk seeker (7 – 10) 57 (25.7%) 27 30* 
Total 222 38 (17.2%) 184 (82.8%) 
 
 
Table 4. Risk preferences of the subjects 
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Especially, in the last category, it is observed that there is a mismatch between the 
subjects’ self-assessment of risk appetite and their choice between a sure amount 
and a lottery. Among the ones who chose the sure amount, three subjects claimed 
that they are extremely risk seeker by choosing 10.  
I want to note that in the calculations presented above, all of the subjects were 
included in the sample. However, while analyzing voting behavior, I consider only 
the ones who participated in the treatments with a voting stage. Also, the data for 
the choice between the lottery and the safe amount is only used to check whether 
the subjects’ self-assessment is valid, not included in the regression analysis.  
 
4.4. Regression Results 
To see which variables affect the voting behavior of a subject, I ran some 
regressions with different explanatory variables that might be potentially associated 
with a subject’s decision. In the regression output given below, the dependent 
variable is "VoteMod" that is 0, if a subject doesn't vote for modification, and 1 
otherwise.  
The explanatory variables included in the regression are the number of rounds in 
which the subject played C in the first part of the game, the number of rounds where 
the outcome was CC in the first part, standardized self-assessed risk score, 
standardized self-assessed trust score, age, sex, academic major, scholarship, 
education level of mother, education level of father, previous lab experience, game 
theory knowledge, and also group size. 
Variable Description 
VoteMod 
C_1 
0 if the subject votes for no modification, 1 otherwise 
the number of rounds in which the subject played C in the first part 
CC_1 the number of rounds where the outcome was CC in the first part 
zRisk Standardized self-assessed risk score 
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zTrust 
Age 
Sex 
Major 
Scholarship 
Standardized self-assessed trust score 
Continuous 
0 if male, 1 if female 
Academic major (categories stated in Table.2 numbered from 0 to 8) 
Merit-based. 0 if scholarship is up to 50% (excluded), 1 if scholarship is from 
50% up to 100%,2 if full-scholarship  
MotherEdu 
FatherEdu 
Experience 
GameTheory 
Education level of mother 
Education level of father 
0 if no previous lab experience, 0 otherwise 
0 if no game theory knowledge, 1 otherwise 
GroupSize 1 if n=30, 2 if n=6 
 
  
 
The regression output presented below shows that among all the explanatory 
variables that are mentioned above together in the regression, the number of rounds 
in which CC played, self-assessed trust score, previous lab experience, and 
scholarship are found to be statistically significant in explaining the subject’s vote 
for modification. Therefore, the hypothesis that subjects who experience mutual 
cooperation outcome more in the first part of the game will have an incentive to 
vote for modification is validated.  
Besides that, we can conclude that cooperation behavior is positively related to trust 
among individuals as expected. The results also suggest that the level of scholarship 
which can be understood as an indicator of intelligence is positively associated with 
the voting behavior in the experiment. This finding is consistent with the results of 
the previous studies in which the level of cooperation and intelligence are found to 
be correlated (Jones, 2008). The statistical significance and negative coefficient of 
previous lab experience suggest that participation in economic experiments makes 
individuals more non-cooperative. This result supports the findings of many 
previous studies that question whether experienced and inexperienced participants 
behave differently in the lab (Benndorf et. al, 2017). 
Table 5. Descriptions of the variables 
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Dependent variable: voting for modification 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
C_1 
0.082 
(0.057)      
0.175** 
(0.079) 
0.212** 
(0.087) 
CC_1 
 
0.093 
(0.145)     
0.381* 
(0.200) 
0.479* 
(0.215) 
CD_1 
  
- 0.149** 
(0.071)     - 
zRisk 
       
-0.133 
(0.142) 
zTrust 
   
0.287** 
(0.120)   
0.269** 
(0.131) 
0.284 
(0.139) 
Age 
       
-0.006 
(0.055) 
Sex 
       
0.242 
(0.282) 
Major 
       
-0.020 
(0.066) 
Scholarship 
    
0.419** 
(0.168)  
0.473** 
(0.185) 
0.479* 
(0.199) 
MotherEdu 
       
0.090 
(0.120) 
FatherEdu 
       
-0.014 
(0.122) 
Experience 
     
-0.543** 
(0.252) 
-0.562** 
(0.270) 
-0.581** 
(0.291) 
GameTheory 
       
0.042 
(0.290) 
GroupSize 
       
0.230 
(0.273) 
Constant 
-1.039*** 
(0.164) 
-0.823*** 
(0.136) 
-1.089*** 
(0.156) 
-0.908*** 
(0.118) 
-1.374*** 
(0.241) 
-0.479** 
(0.121) 
-1.223*** 
(0.353) 
-1.607 
(1.458) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***significant at the 1% level. 
  **significant at the 5% level. 
       *significant at 10% level. 
     
 
 
Table 6. Probit Model Regression Output I – dependent variable: VoteMod 
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Since the marginal effects of scholarship and experience are statistically significant 
and relatively greater, I regroup individuals according to their scholarship status 
and past lab experience to analyze the effect of these variables on voting decision 
better. In this categorization, I transform “scholarship” into a binary variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the participant has full-scholarship and 0 otherwise. There are 
four subgroups: 
 
- Scholarship & lab experience 
- Scholarship & no lab experience  
- No scholarship & lab experience 
- No scholarship & no lab experience 
Among the participants in the treatments with a voting stage, the majority (76.5%) 
has previous lab experience. Therefore, in the subgroups with no lab experience, 
there are very few observations. Below table summarizes the number of 
observations across subgroups.  
 Number of 
observations 
Scholarship & lab experience 43 
Scholarship & no lab experience 10 
No scholarship & lab experience 81 
No scholarship & no lab experience 28 
 
 
According to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test results that are presented in Appendix I, 
there is no statistically significant difference in voting behavior between the 
participants with scholarship and the ones with no scholarship. Similarly, the results 
imply that the voting behavior of students who have scholarship does not change 
with prior lab experience. On the other hand, conditioning on prior lab experience, 
Table 7. Number of observations across subgroups 
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there is a significant difference between participants who have a scholarship and 
those who do not at a 10% significance level. Furthermore, the voting behavior of 
those who do not have scholarship changes with lab experience. The corresponding 
p-value is found to be 0.01. 
To further check for the robustness of the results, I investigate the impact of risk 
and trust preferences of individuals on voting behavior by comparing the action of 
individuals with extreme trust and risk scores. In other words, I compare the 
decision of participants who are extremely risk-averse (with a risk score of 0) with 
the decision of those who are extremely risk seeker (with a risk score of 10). The 
same comparison is made for individuals with extreme trust scores as well. 
However, in both cases, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test implies that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the participants with extreme risk and/or 
trust scores in terms of their voting behavior.  
In addition to the analysis of voting behavior, I also concentrate on how people act 
in the 11th round, right after the voting stage, to understand the effect of the policy 
selection mechanism on cooperation. In this model, action of a subject in the 11th 
round that is the dependent variable is regressed on the vote of the subject, the 
number of rounds in which the subject played C in the first ten rounds, the number 
of CC outcomes the subject faced in the first part, standardized self-assessed risk 
score, standardized self-assessed trust score, group size, whether there is a match 
between the subjects vote and the decision of the group and policy selection 
mechanism (EndoMod, EndoNot, ExoMod, ExoNot). 
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Dependent variable: action in the 11th round 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
C_1 
0.191*** 
(0.059)       
0.274** 
(0.083) 
CC_1 
 
0.139 
(0.131)      
0.253 
(0.193) 
zRisk 
  
-0.026 
(0.113)     
-0.118 
(0.121) 
zTrust 
   
0.107** 
(0.116)    
0.095 
(0.126) 
VoteMod 
    
0.150 
(0.280)   
-0.092 
(0.309) 
Mechanism 
     
0.083 
(0.134)  
0.102 
(0.149) 
GroupSize 
      
-0.020 
(0.228) 
-0.033 
(0.241) 
Constant 
-
1.290*** 
(0.181) 
-
0.958*** 
(0.141) 
-
0.873*** 
(0.113) 
-
0.878*** 
(0.114) 
-
0.903** 
(0.127) 
-
1.028*** 
(0.278) 
0.861*** 
(0.169) 
-
1.474*** 
(0.368) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***significant at the 1% level. 
  **significant at the 5% level. 
       *significant at 10% level. 
 
 
The regression results imply that among all the variables that are expected to be 
associated with a subject’s action in the first round of the second part of the 
experiment, only number of rounds in which the subject played C in the first part is 
found to be statistically significant. Given this result, we cannot comment on the 
effect of the policy selection mechanism on cooperation behavior of a subject since 
the variable “Mechanism” is statistically insignificant in explaining the action in 
the 11th round. Similarly, neither risk preferences of subjects nor trust among 
individuals is related to cooperative behavior of a subject right after the voting 
stage. The variable “GroupSize” is also found to be not associated with the 
dependent variable.  
Table 8. Probit model regression output II – dependent variable: Action_11 
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As I mentioned earlier, since there is no observation in the EndoMod case, it is not 
possible to make a comparison regarding the cooperation levels between the groups 
that are exposed to different policy selection mechanisms. That’s why I include the 
variable Mechanism in the regression to at least see if the outcome of the voting 
stage can explain how individuals play in the second part.  
Moreover, I ran some other alternative regression analyses with different 
explanatory variables including the variable Match which takes a value of 1 if a 
subject’s vote is the same with the outcome of the majority decision and 0 
otherwise, and CD_1 that is used in the previous regression explaining voting 
behavior. None of these alternative models give significantly different results than 
the one I present above. Again, it is found that C_1 is the only statically significant 
variable that explains how people behave in the 11th round of the experiment. I also 
consider adding an interaction term for standardized risk and trust scores. However, 
when I rerun the corresponding regressions, the term is found to be insignificant.  
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this thesis study, I concentrated on the relationship between the way in which a 
policy/rule applied and cooperative behavior in groups. In an experimental setting, 
with the participation of 222 subjects, I tested the claim that the effect of a policy 
on the level of cooperation is greater when it is chosen democratically than when it 
is imposed from outside.  
The results show that even if there is no prior experience of a reference point, people 
do not coordinate on the socially efficient outcome, mutually cooperation. Also, 
coordination on the 50-50 equilibrium is decreasing as the subjects gain experience. 
When we consider the first part of the treatments with a voting stage, it is seen that 
cooperation decreases in the prisoners’ dilemma game with experience confirming 
the findings of the previous studies in the literature.  
At the individual level, it is observed that people rarely play C in both games, the 
PD game, and the coordination game, namely. As I discussed in the previous 
chapter, from risk aversion to cultural factors shaping trust among individuals, we 
can argue for many underlying factors that might explain the low level of individual 
cooperation. Also, it might be the case that the difference in payoffs between two 
actions is not that significant in the cooperation game, and therefore, the subjects 
are indifferent between getting a payoff of 50 and 49. By increasing the punishment 
on unilateral defection, put it differently, decreasing the payoff of playing D when 
other player plays C, might affect individuals’ cooperation decisions. Similarly, the 
difference between equilibrium payoffs, 50 and 40, might not be that remarkable in 
the eyes of the subjects. Increasing the difference between the two equilibrium 
payoffs, we can find out if the results are robust and generalizable.   
Furthermore, we see that the vast majority of subjects do not vote for modification. 
As implied by the analyses explained in detail in the previous chapter, the voting 
decision is influenced by the number of rounds in which CC played in the first part, 
self-assessed trust score, previous lab experience, and scholarship. Therefore, we 
can conclude that the level of mutual cooperation experienced in the first part 
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shapes people’s expectations regarding the outcome in the second part of the 
experiment and hence affects how they vote for modification. Also, some individual 
characteristics play a crucial role in shaping how people vote after playing the PD 
game. Trust attitudes and cognitive abilities are positively correlated with voting 
for modification, whereas it is exactly the opposite for having previous laboratory 
experience.  
As it is mentioned previously, unlike the benchmark study conducted in the US in 
this study, there is no observation in which the modification of the payoffs is 
imposed by the votes of group members. To explain this issue, I discussed the 
possible impact of some socio-cultural factors such as social capital that might 
influence the trust between group members, and thus, the subjects’ vote in this 
experiment. Starting from this point of view, we can suggest that the study can be 
replicated with a different pool of subjects to investigate whether the results are 
Turkey specific or not.  
Considering the mutual cooperation in the second part, our results suggest that a 
subject’s action in the 11th round only depends on the number of rounds in which 
the subject played C in the first part. Therefore, if a subject chooses C more often 
in the PD game played in the first part, then she is expected to play C more often in 
the second part as well. Due to the low number of observations, it is not possible to 
make a group-level comparison between the cases.  
Moreover, the findings suggest that group size explains neither how people vote 
nor how they cooperate. This can be the case due to the low number of observations 
in this study. Increasing the number of observations at the group level might provide 
us with more reliable and informative results so that we can see if group size, in 
other words, size of the majority in this design, has a real impact on cooperation 
behavior. 
Overall, the findings of this thesis study shed light on some aspects of the 
relationship between democratic institutions and prosocial behavior, in this setting 
mutual cooperation, and suggest that in order to clearly understand the dynamics of 
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this relationship we should conduct some complementary studies. Especially, 
having more observations at the group level might yield more valid and significant 
results that can serve as a starting point for future studies focusing on prosocial 
behavior in democratic and undemocratic environments.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix I: Test Results 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test to check if the distribution of mutual cooperation is the 
same in large and small groups: 
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test results to check if the distribution of voting for 
modification is the same in subgroups. 
No scholarship & no lab experience vs. scholarship & no lab experience: 
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No scholarship & lab experience vs. scholarship & lab experience: 
 
 
Scholarship & lab experience vs. scholarship & no lab experience: 
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No scholarship & lab experience vs. no scholarship & no lab experience: 
 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test to check if the distribution of voting for modification is 
the same for participants with extreme risk scores. 
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The Wilcoxon rank-sum test to check if the distribution of voting for modification is 
the same for participants with extreme self-assessed trust scores. 
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Appendix II: Screenshots of the Experiment  
Welcoming screen:   
 
 
 
Coordination game: 
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Information screen shown after each round: 
 
 
 
 
Explanation for the voting stage: 
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Voting Screen: 
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Result of the voting stage: 
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Total Payoff Earned: 
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Questionnaire: 
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Risk Questions: 
Staircase method: 
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Self-assessment question: 
 
 
Trust Question: 
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Final Earnings Screen: 
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Appendix III: Instructions for the Treatment Without Voting 
Deney Yönergesi 
Bu bir karar alma deneyidir ve bilimsel bir projenin parçasıdır.  
Deney tamamlanıp laboratuvardan ayrılıncaya kadar diğer katılımcılarla iletişim 
kurmanız yasaktır. Deneyin herhangi bir aşamasında bir sorunuz ya da sorununuz 
olduğunda, lütfen elinizi kaldırın ve deney görevlilerinden birinin yanınıza 
gelmesini bekleyin. Sorularınızı yüksek sesle sormayın, diğer katılımcıların 
dikkatini dağıtacak hareketlerde bulunmaktan kaçının. 
Deneyde elde edeceğiniz kazanç alacağınız kararlara bağlıdır. Kazancınızın ne 
şekilde belirleneceği bu yönergede detaylı bir şekilde açıklanmıştır. Bu nedenle, 
yönergeyi dikkatle okumanız ve anlamanız önemlidir.  
Deney süresince aldığınız kararlar ve verdiğiniz cevaplar tamamen anonimdir, 
hiçbir kimlik bilgisi ile eşleştirilmemektedir. 
Deney, her turda laboratuvardaki başka bir katılımcıyla rastgele eşleşeceğiniz 20 
turdan oluşmaktadır. Her turda eşleştiğiniz katılımcıyla aynı anda iki seçenekten (1 
ya da 2) birini seçmeniz istenecektir. Kazandığınız puan aşağıda açıklandığı gibi 
hem sizin kararınıza hem de eşleştiğiniz katılımcının kararına bağlı olacaktır. 
 Eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 1’i seçerse ve siz de 1’i seçerseniz, 50 puan 
kazanacaksınız.  Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcı da 50 puan 
kazanacaktır.  
 Eğer eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 1’i seçerse ve siz 2’yi seçerseniz, 49 puan 
kazanacaksınız. Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcının kazancı 10 olacaktır.  
 Eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 2’yi seçerken siz 1’i seçerseniz, 10 puan 
kazanacaksınız. Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 49 puan kazanacaktır.  
 Eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 2’yi seçerse ve siz de 2’yi seçerseniz, 40 puan 
kazanacaksınız. Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcının kazancı da 40 puan 
olacaktır. 
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20. turun bitiminde kısa bir anket cevaplamanız istenecektir ve devamında deney 
sona erecektir. 
Deneyin sonunda, 20 turdan 4 tanesi rastgele seçilecektir. Daha sonra bu turlarda 
kazandığınız puanların ortalaması alınacak ve bu ortalama 0.5 TL ile çarpılarak 
deney sonu kazancınız belirlenecektir. Elde edeceğiniz kazanç için ödeme, deney 
oturumunun bitiminde hemen ve nakit olarak yapılacaktır. Kazancınız hakkında 
diğer katılımcılara bilgi verilmeyecektir. 
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Appendix IV: Instructions for the Large Group Treatment 
Deney Yönergesi 
Bu bir karar alma deneyidir ve bilimsel bir projenin parçasıdır.  
Deney tamamlanıp laboratuvardan ayrılıncaya kadar diğer katılımcılarla iletişim 
kurmanız yasaktır. Deneyin herhangi bir aşamasında bir sorunuz ya da sorununuz 
olduğunda, lütfen elinizi kaldırın ve deney görevlilerinden birinin yanınıza 
gelmesini bekleyin. Sorularınızı yüksek sesle sormayın, diğer katılımcıların 
dikkatini dağıtacak hareketlerde bulunmaktan kaçının. 
Deneyde elde edeceğiniz kazanç alacağınız kararlara bağlıdır. Kazancınızın ne 
şekilde belirleneceği bu yönergede detaylı bir şekilde açıklanmıştır. Bu nedenle, 
yönergeyi dikkatle okumanız ve anlamanız önemlidir.  
Deney süresince aldığınız kararlar ve verdiğiniz cevaplar tamamen anonimdir, 
hiçbir kimlik bilgisi ile eşleştirilmemektedir. 
Deney, iki bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölümde, her turda laboratuvardaki 
başka bir katılımcıyla rastgele eşleşeceğiniz 10 tur olacaktır. Her turda eşleştiğiniz 
katılımcıyla aynı anda iki seçenekten (1 ya da 2) birini seçmeniz istenecektir. 
Kazandığınız puan aşağıda açıklandığı gibi hem sizin kararınıza hem de eşleştiğiniz 
katılımcının kararına bağlı olacaktır. 
 Eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 1’i seçerse ve siz de 1’i seçerseniz, 50 puan 
kazanacaksınız. Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcı da 50 puan kazanacaktır.  
 Eğer eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 1’i seçerse ve siz 2’yi seçerseniz, 60 puan 
kazanacaksınız. Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcının kazancı 10 olacaktır.  
 Eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 2’yi seçerken siz 1’i seçerseniz, 10 puan 
kazanacaksınız. Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 60 puan kazanacaktır.  
 Eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 2’yi seçerse ve siz de 2’yi seçerseniz, 40 puan 
kazanacaksınız. Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcının kazancı da 40 puan 
olacaktır. 
 55 
10. turun sonunda, oynadığınız oyunla puanları farklı olan ikinci bir oyun arasında 
bir oylama yapılacaktır. Oylamada laboratuvardaki tüm katılımcılar oy 
kullanacaktır. Eğer puanlar değişirse; 
 Eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 1’i seçerse ve siz de 1’i seçerseniz, 50 puan 
kazanacaksınız. Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcı da 50 puan kazanacaktır.  
 Eğer eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 1’i seçerse ve siz 2’yi seçerseniz, 49 puan 
kazanacaksınız. Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcının kazancı 10 olacaktır.  
 Eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 2’yi seçerken siz 1’i seçerseniz, 10 puan 
kazanacaksınız. Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 49 puan kazanacaktır.  
 Eşleştiğiniz katılımcı 2’yi seçerse ve siz de 2’yi seçerseniz, 40 puan 
kazanacaksınız. Bu durumda, eşleştiğiniz katılımcının kazancı da 40 puan 
olacaktır. 
İlk olarak, iki oyun arasında oylama yapılacaktır. Ardından, bilgisayar oylama 
sonucunu dikkate alıp almamaya karar verecektir. Eğer oylama sonucu dikkate 
alınırsa, çoğunluğun kararı geçerli olacaktır. Eşitlik durumunda hangi oyunun 
oynanacağı bilgisayar tarafından belirlenecektir. Bilgisayar oylama sonucunu 
dikkate almazsa, oyun puanlarını değiştirip değiştirmemeye rastgele bir şekilde 
karar verecektir. Oylamadan sonra, oylama sonucunun dikkate alınıp alınmadığı, 
oyun puanlarının değişip değişmediği ve oy sayıları konusunda size bilgi 
verilecektir.  
Oylamadan sonra ikinci bölüme geçilecektir. Bu bölüm, seçilen oyunu her turda 
laboratuvardaki başka bir katılımcıyla rastgele eşleşerek oynayacağınız 10 turdan 
oluşmaktadır. 10 turun sonunda kısa bir anket cevaplamanız istenecektir. Böylece, 
deney sona ermiş olacaktır. 
Deneyin sonunda, 20 turdan 4 tanesi rastgele seçilecektir. Daha sonra bu turlarda 
kazandığınız puanların ortalaması alınacak ve bu ortalama 0.5 TL ile çarpılarak 
deney sonu kazancınız belirlenecektir. Elde edeceğiniz kazanç için ödeme, deney 
oturumunun bitiminde hemen ve nakit olarak yapılacaktır. Kazancınız hakkında 
diğer katılımcılara bilgi verilmeyecektir. 
